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Ultra-processed food and drink industries are one of the major 
drivers of the world epidemic of obesity and non-communicable 
diseases (NCDs), through the production, intensive marketing, 
and wide availability of energy dense nutritionally poor (EDNP) 
food and drinks (1). While fresh and perishable whole or 
minimally processed foods are healthier, most of the food and 
drink industries profits come from increasing consumption 
of ENDP products, making their interest irreconcilable with 
public health objectives (2). It is not surprising, then, that 
those industries deploy strategies to undermine public health 
policies and interventions aimed to reduce the consumption 
of EDNP products. I am going to outline the main strategies 
used, as described in the literature, and show how they are 
undermining the public health efforts to tackle the epidemic of 
obesity and NCDs in Spain.
The first strategy consist is to bias research findings. Although 
there is ample evidence of the association between sugar-
sweetened beverages and obesity, the studies declaring 
conflicts of interest with the food industry are up to five times 
more likely to present a conclusion of no association (3). A 
complementary strategy is to divert the attention from the 
health effect of their products, emphasizing physical activity 
over diet and stating that there are no good or bad foods 
(4). A recent example in Spain is the consensus document 
about obesity and sedentarism in the 21st century, endorsed 
by national experts on nutrition, the executive director of the 
Spanish Food Security and Nutrition Agency, and representatives 
of Coca-Cola Iberia, being the outcome of a workshop funded by 
that company in a luxurious environment (5).
The second strategy consist of influencing civil society thinking 
by questioning the legitimacy of government intervention, 
developing customers as soon as possible, and promoting a 
positive image of their companies. Noteworthy is the food and 
drink industries appeal to individual freedom and responsibility, 
claiming that legal restrictions regarding what one eats or 
sees on television are a sort of unjustifiable paternalism 
typical of the nanny state (6). Such kind of arguments have 
been used in Spain to avoid statutory regulations regarding 
food marketing of EDNP products directed to children and 
the presence of vending machines in schools, both aimed to 
develop customers  since early childhood, a crucial period of 
personality development and acquisition of habits (7).  
The third strategy is to co-opt public health professionals, 
trough financial support in many ways (funding professional 
organizations and foundations, sponsorship university full 
professorship positions, and so on), and to lobby public health 
officials and politicians to oppose statutory regulations (8). 
This undue influence is especially noteworthy in Spain, where 
the health authorities who implemented the Spanish strategy 
of Nutrition, Physical Activity and Obesity Prevention (NAOS) 
endorsed in 2005 some of the arguments commonly put 
forward by these private corporations (“it is not about good or 
bad food”) to justify and promote voluntary agreements with the 
food industry and self-regulation of food advertising targeted 
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at children and vending machines in schools (7). Some years 
later, the opinions of stakeholders regarding the impact of 
food marketing and its regulation policies on childhood obesity 
in Spain were analyzed (9). Whereas consumer, public health, 
and child and family advocates believed that there is a clear 
association between food marketing and childhood obesity, 
and that regulations are ineffective; advertising advocates, 
food manufactures and government representatives believed 
just the opposite. In spite of the scientific evidence supporting 
public health advocates views (10), it is noteworthy the 
government’s alignment with advertising advocates and food 
manufactures. This is a clear indication that the food industry 
is still in the driver’s seat of the country’s food policy. Not 
surprising, bearing in mind that, at the time, the executive 
director of the Spanish Food Security and Nutrition Agency 
was the former Coca-Cola Iberia manager of scientific and 
normative affairs (11). As a consequence, the new Spanish code 
of co-regulation of food marketing to children, in breach of the 
WHO recommendations (12), ignores the frequency of exposure 
to or the nutritional quality of the products advertised, so that 
it is powerless to reduce children’s exposure to EDNPs food 
and beverages. Furthermore, on restricting its application in 
audiovisual and printed media to children under the age of 12, 
it contravenes the provisions of the Food Safety & Nutrition Act 
which lays down that advertising directed to children up to 15 
years of age should be regulated, by permitting, for example, 
that television food advertising targeted at children over the 
age of 12 may make use of well-known public celebrities who 
enjoy a high degree of popularity among the child audience 
(11).
In the opening address at the 8th Global Conference on Health 
Promotion, Margaret Chan, Director-General of the World 
Health Organization, reminded us that “efforts to prevent 
NCDs go against the business interests of powerful economic 
operators, including Big Food and Big Soda” (13). In view of 
WHO, as stated by Dr Chan, “the formulation of health policies 
must be protected from distortion by commercial or vested 
interests”. If the states followed this advice from now on, it will 
be a giant step in the prevention and management of obesity 
and NCDs.
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